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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-----------------------------------------




SALVADOR P. TOSCANO, SR., 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16777 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by the State of Utah 
against the Appellant to recover public assistance payments 
received by him from having supplied the state agency with 
factually incorrect information. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Trial before the lower court was held with the 
court granting judgment in favor of the State of Utah in 
the amount of $2,921.00. (R. 82). The trial court held 
that the judgment represented public assistance the Appellant 
had obtained to which he was not entitled because of 
Appellant having supplied factually incorrect information 
to the State of Utah (R. 82). 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the District Court's 
decision. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Appellant came from Texas in the spring of 1975 
for the purpose of finding work in Utah. He found work in 
the onion and beet fields (R. 104). After arriving and while 
working, he injured his knee, requiring medical care. (R. 104), 
After the injury, in June, 1975, appellant applied 
and was approved for public assistance benefits from the 
State of Utah in the form of Food Stamps for each month from 
June, 1975, through June, 1976. In December of 1975, Mr. 
Toscano applied for additional cash assistance from the state 
and received that assistance monthly through June, 1976. 
Total assistance recelved for Food Stamps was $2,846.00, and 
for cash assistance was $2,921.00. (R. 50). 
Appellant was only under doctors care for a few 
months, with no evidence produced that his injury affected 
him past November, 1975 (R. 104,110). 
Application was made for assistance with appellant 
indicating that he intended to make Utah his home (R. 118). 
on each application signed and submitted by appellant, the 
appellant stated that he did not own any land, acreage, 
or buildings in which he did not live (R. 67). 
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In December of 1976, the respondent learned 
that the appellant did in fact own real property in Muleshoe, 
Texas, valued at $10,580.00, whereupon the respondent 
commenced this action against the appellant. 
In June of 1977, respondent filed a complaint 
alleging that appellant had fraudulently received food 
stamp and financial aid assistance. Later, the food stamp 
allegation was dropped by the respondent because of the 
different regulations governing food stamp assistance. 
However, the claim against the appellant for fraudulently 
receiving financial aid was vigorously prosecuted and was 
not decided until trial by the Honorable Judge Calvin Gould. 
During the trial on September 27, 1979, and October 
1, 1979, testimony was adduced that appellant was not fluent 
in English. However, further testimony established: (1) 
Millie Rodriquez Valencia, who speaks Spanish, and was 
associated with the Migrant Council, admitted she notarized 
appellant's financial aid application on November 17, 1975 
(R. 143 and 145); (2) An interpreter at the Assistance 
Payments Administration (APA) Office assisted the appellant 
and his wife in answering questions on.the public assistance 
forms (R. 166); and (3) The Migrant Council and the APA 
had an agreement that the Migrant Council would assist 
Spanish speaking m.igrants in filling out public assistance 
forms (R. 133-134). 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Contrary to what appellant alleges in his statement 
of facts, the trial record makes clear that the appellant 
never made any reference at trial about whether an APA 
representative asked him about his owning a home in Muleshoe, 
Texas. 
In October of 1979, Judge Calvin Gould concluded 
that the payments by the respondent to the appellant of 
$2,921.00 in financial aid was the result of a factual 
error and not fraud but that the cash payments to appellant 
by the state would not have been made had the respondent 
known or understood that the appellant in fact owned a home 
and real property in Texas (R. 82). Thus, the District 
Judge entered a judgment against the appellant for $2,921.00 
plus costs (R. 83). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO RECEIVE 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE BECAUSE HE OWNED 
NON-EXEMPT REAL PROPERTY IN MULESHOE, 
TEXAS. 
The issue presented to this court in the instant 
case is whether Mr. Toscano was eligible to receive financial 
assistance. Appellant attempts to confuse this issue as 
discussed in his brief by urging this court to adopt 
regulations governing food stamp eligibility to be applied 
equally to situations involving financial assistance. This 
-4-
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position is an improper interpretation and application 
of the two distinct programs. 
Testimony was presented at trial (R. 115-121) 
which pointed out the distinction of the two programs and 
that Food Stamp Regulations do not apply to financial cases, 
though both types of assistance might be received by the 
same individual at the same time. This testimony is unrefut~d 
in the record and is summarized as follows: 
(1) Each type of assistance has its own unique 
eligibility requirements. 
(2) Food Stamp assistance is governed exclusively 
by regulations promulgated by the United State Department 
of Agriculture, while cash assistance is governed exclusively 
by regulations promulgated by the United States Department 
of Health, Education and Welfare. 
3. The State of Utah's financial assistance regulations 
are promulgated under Volume II and Food Stamp regulations 
are contained in Volume IV of the Assistance Payments Admini-
stration volumes. 
The State of Utah, in essence to receive federal 
funds to aid in programs designed to help the disadvantaged 
administer the programs from separate federal agencies. 
Food stamps used to be distributed through the Post Office 
of the United States. No one would contend that the state 
regulations as promulgated for financial assistance in 
-5-
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Volume II would have applied to the Post Office. The fact 
that APA is handling two distinct programs for two distinct 
federal departments likewise does not authorize anyone to 
say that specific provisions from one programs apply across-
the-board to another program. Yet, this is what counsel for 
the appellant is attempting to argue. 
Therefore, if one tries to confuse the issue of 
this case by comingling two different types of assistance 
regulations, it is analogous to mixing oil with water. 
They don't mix and will separate to original groups that 
existed before the attempted mix. The food stamp assistance 
and financial assistance regulations were intended to be 
separate and independent of one another. When Mr. Toscano 
applied for financial assistance, he applied on a separate 
application. His approval for financial assistance was made 
in compliance with the regulations of Volume II of the Utah 
rules. Volume IV was never considered in approving Mr. 
Toscano's financial application. Thus, only the financial 
assistance regulations should govern this case. 
The financial assistance regulations applicable 
to this case are stated as follows in Volume II, Section 
410.1: 
§410.l Exempt Assets: 
1. One home and lot owned or being purchased 
and occupied by the applicant or recipient, 
including a mobile home. (Emphasis added). 
-6-
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a. If the home is owned or being purchased, 
the lot on which the home stands shall 
not exceed the average size of residential 
lots for the community in which it is 
located. The amount of property exceeding 
an average-size lot shall not be con-
sidered exempt property. 
b. When an individual owns but does not 
occupy a mobile home, the equity value 
of the mobile home shall not be considered 
except personal property. 
It is -interesting to note that the only inaccurate 
information supplied by Mr. Toscano on his financial aid 
application is the information that was most essential in 
determining whether Mr. Toscano was eligible for financial 
assistance. All other information was accurate on his 
application. Therefore, if Mr. Toscano would have answered 
correctly the question concerning his owning real property; 
the issue of whether or not he occupied his home in Muleshoe, 
Texas, during the period he received financial assistance 
and living in Utah, would not be before this court now. 
The financial assistance regulations, supra, state 
that a lot and home to be exempt must be occupied by the 
applicant or recipient. In addition, it is important to 
point out that Volume II contains no special regulations 
covering migrants; hence, migrant status is irrelevant to 
determining eligibility for financial assistance and a 
migrant must qualify the same as any other applicant (R. 115). 
Whether Mr. Toscano was or was not a migrant is consequently 
7-
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not at issue. To have his home exempted for financial 
assistance purposes, it must be the home he occupies. 
In December, 1975, when Mr. Toscano applied for 
financial assistance and during the months Mr. Toscano 
received financial assistance, he did not occupy the home 
and lot in Muleshoe, Texas. (R. 22 and 23). It is pointed 
out that Volume II does not define the term occupied, but 
it is submitted that the general dictionary definition is 
applicable. Webster's Dictionary (1974 ed.) at 794, defines 
occupy as "to reside in as an owner or tenant." This is 
the same definition that the APA office has used in determining 
one's eligibility. The following statements made by Mr. 
Larson at trial show this to be correct: 
Mr. Barclay: "Is there a definition as to 
what it means to be occupied 
in the regulation?" 
Mr. Larson: "Not specifically. Occupied is 
generally assumed to mean that 
the individual is living in the 
home." 
Mr. Barclay: "That is the application applied 
by your agency?" 
Mr. Larson: "Yes." (R. 117). 
Even though the insurance cases cited by appellant 
are not very applicable to the present situation, these 
cases still uphold the definition of occupied as a place 
"in actual use by human beings who are living in it as a 
place of habitation ... ", (Independent Fire Insurance Company 
-8-
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v. Butler, 362 So.2d 980, 982 (1978). The appellant was 
not living in his home in Muleshoe, Texas, when he received 
financial assistance payments in Utah. (Amarillo which is 
closer to Salt Lake City than Muleshoe is 888 miles from 
Salt Lake City; see also Mr. Toscano's affidavit, R. 22). 
It may be true that appellant visited Muleshoe, Texas, on 
occasion, however, this does not mean he occupied the home 
in Muleshoe. 
Counsel for respondent himself feels the absurdity 
of this argument of appellant from his own personal experience. 
Counsel was born and raised in Freeport, Illinois, approximately 
1360 miles away from Provo, Utah. After graduation from 
High School counsel attended Brigham Young University for 
four years of undergraduate study. Except for a few belongings, 
clothes, etc., counsel's entire belongings remained at his 
parents' home in Illinois for four years. Counsel lived in 
a residential hall for three years and in a private home off 
campus for the last year. At all times he maintained 
permanent residence in Illinois at his parents and in fact 
visited his permanent residence at Christmastime, summertime 
(going to and coming from jobs away from that home) . . He 
received mail there that entire time, had his belongings 
there, and even voted there by "absentee ballot." 
To say that counsel for respondent "occupied" the 
home in Illinois at the same time he was living (even temporarily) 
-9-
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in Provo, Utah, is inconceivable. was he not "occupying" 
his room in the residence hall? Certainly he was and the 
court should reject any theory to the contrary. 
Appellant is obviously trying to confuse the 
issue~ He is trying to urge this court to accept the position 
that a person does not "occupy" the place where he sleeps, 
stays or resides during the period in this case, but somehow 
is in two places at once and therefore qualifies for assistance. 
The record is clear that the principle residence -
where the appellant lived, ate, slept, stayed - during the 
period of December, 1975, through June, 1976, was in Utah. 
There is no evidence or testimony directly substantiating 
that appellant even went back to Texas during the time he 
was receiving financial assistance. However, even if 
appellant did return to Texas, the visits were short and· 
infrequent because appellant's financial assistance checks 
were all mailed to his residence in Utah and cashed in Utah. 
How could he be occupying his home in Texas and living 
there if he was cashing his checks in Utah. 
Appellant also argues that even though he was 
not physically living in the Muleshoe home, his children 
were living there. This statement made by appellant makes 
no difference in determining whether appellant was eligible 
for financial assistance because the financial assistance 
regulations specifically state that a home to be exempt 
-10= .n 
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must be occupied by the applicant or recipient of the 
assistance, in this case Salvador Toscano. (Volume II, 
Section 410.1.) Therefore, Judge Calvin Gould did not abuse 
his discretion in deciding that the home in Muleshoe, Texas, 
was a non-exempt asset. 
Since the home in Muleshoe was a non-exempt resource 
and had a value of $10,580.00, this resource if reported 
would have made Mr. Toscano ineligible for financial assistance 
and the respondent would not have paid the same to appellant. 
POINT II 
RESPONDENT'S FAILURE TO PROVE BY CLEAR 
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE THAT APPELLANT 
COMMITTED FRAUD DOES NOT MEAN APPELLANT 
WAS WITHOUT FAULT IN SUPPLYING INCORRECT 
INFORMATION ON HIS FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE 
APPLICATION. 
Appellant appears to have asserted certain positions 
in his brief which are not substantiated by the record. 
Respondent feels it important to point them out. For example, 
appellant states that the APA off ice had no staff members 
fluent in Spanish. This statement is incorrect and not in 
harmony with the unrefuted trial testimony of Mr. Larson: 
Mr. Larson: 
Mr. Ayala: 
II I am aware of one individual . 
who has been an employee for a 
number of years back prior t6 
'75. He does speak Spanish." 
"So basically we are sure that 
we have one person among 60 people 
that does speak Spanish, am I 
correct?" 
-11-
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Mr. Larson: "Yes, at least one. And I think 
at the time there was another 
Spanish American girl." 
Mr. Ayala: "But you are sure of one anyway, 
am I correct?" 
Mr. Larson: "Yes." (R. 124). 
From the above dialogue it is evident that there 
was at least one person who could speak fluent Spanish at 
the APA office during the period when Mr. Toscano applied 
for financial assistance. The record also shows that the 
APA off ice personnel would ask for an interpreter to assist 
them if someone came in the office who was unable to speak 
English. (R. 112 and 113). Therefore, if Mr. Toscano's 
application was filled out at the APA office there would 
have been an interpreter available to him. {Note: It is 
not clear from the record whether Mr. Toscano filled out 
his financial application at the Migrant Council's office 
or at the APA's office.) 
Appellant also makes the statement that the 
record shows him to be without faults in applying for 
financial assistance. Such a finding was never made by the 
trial judge. Judge Calvin Gould only determined that the 
respondent did not carry his heavy burden of proving 
appellant's fraud by clear and convincing evidence. (See 
Schwartz v. Tanner, 576 P.2d 873 (1978), for burden placed 
on one proving fraud). Thus, not being able to prove the 
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heavy burden of fraud, does not mean the appellant was without 
fault. The Washington Supreme Court stated the following 
concerning one's burden in providing fraud: 
Fraud, therefore, is never presumedi to be 
clear, cogent and convincing, the evidence 
must be greater than a mere preponderance. 
Markov v. ABC Transfer & Storage Company, 
76 Wash.2d 388, 457 P.2d 535,539 (1969). 
In the present case, respondent was unable to prov~ 
more than a preponderance; still substantial evidence and 
testimony was presented at the trial showing that Mr. Toscano 
was not blameless when he supplied the inaccurate information 
on his financial application. Below are a few of the points 
showing that Mr. Toascao was not without fault: 
(1) Millie Rodriquez Valencia, a member of the 
Migrant Council who speaks Spanish notarized appellant's 
financial aid application (R. 143 and 145); 
(2) An interpreter whose native language is Spanish 
was available to assist the appellant in filling out his 
financial assistance application at the APA off ice (R. 123 
and 124); 
(3) On all of appellant's applications and re-
applications for public assistance, Mr: Toscano answered 
all of the questions correctly except the question that would 
make him ineligible for financial assistance (R. 119 and 120); 
and 
(4) If Mr. Toscano did not understand a question on 
-13-
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the financial assistance application as it was being 
interpreted for him then he should have made some effort 
to have the question clarified or at t,he very least he 
should have let the interpreter know that he didn't 
understand the question. 
Maybe, the above are not enough to meet the heavy 
burden of proving fraud; however, the above points should 
indicate that Mr. Toscano was not without fault in supplying 
the incorrect information. 
Appellant, in Point II of his brief also makes a 
policy argument that the respondent should not be allowed 
to collect administrative error overpayments. First of all, 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 55-15a-24 specifically authorizes 
the Department to collect administrative overpayments. Second, 
there is no evidence or finding by the court that this matter 
was in fact an administrative error. Third, with the non-
reporting of ownership of a home, with the state not having 
knowledge of the ownership, administrative error is a false 
classification anyway. As such, respondent rejects this 
argument as totally improper. 
As the United State Supreme Court said: 
Conflicting claims of morality and 
intelligence are raised by opponents and 
proponents of almost every measure, certainly 
including the one before us. But the 
intractable economic, social, and even 
philosophical problems presented by public 
welfare assistance programs are not the 
-14 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
business of this Court .... 
In the same case the United States Supreme Court reiterates 
the same point by stating: 
... the Constitution does not empower this 
Court to second-guess state officials 
charged with the difficult responsibility 
of allocating limited public welfare funds 
among the myriad of potential recipients. 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 487 
(1970). 
Funds paid to a recipient which should not be paid 
because of ineligibility takes away from those who legitimately 
deserve aid. Appellant is requesting this Court to legislate 
whether the state should collect the overpaid funds as was 
evidenced at trial. That is not the purpose of this court. 
In the case of Trade Commission v. Skaggs Drug Centers, Inc., 
21 Utah2d 431, 446 P.2d 958 (1968) this court said: 
Cognizant of the contending forces, 
we must realize the field in which the 
court operates is limited. It does not 
lie within the province of the court to 
pass upon the wisdom, the need or the 
desirability of any legislation, nor to 
choose between two opposing political 
philosophies. It is not the function 
of the court to ameliorate the conditions 
of those in want, nor is its purpose 
to solve the economic, social or 
religious problems and dissensions 
which beset society. The court is not 
the conscience of the State or its 
people. It does not fall within its 
duty to express the personal desires 
or philosophy of its personnel. 
The court does not determine who 
is large or who is small nor who is 
rich or who is poor. It operates upon 
-15-
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a state of facts to effect justice between 
contending parties and interests all in 
accordance with established legal and 
equitable rules and regulations. 
The court must voluntarily restrain 
itself by holding strictly to an exercise 
and expression of its delegated or innate 
power to interpret and adjudicate. We 
have been called upon to state what the 
law is and not what we think it should be. 
The question as to whether the statute in 
question is or is not economically sound 
or beneficial is not for the court to 
decide, but such an inquiry is a matter for 
the legislature. (Emphasis added.) 
See also Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah2d 138, 434 P.2d 449 
(1967); Great Salt Lake Authority v. Island Ranching Co~, 
18 Utah2d 45, 414 P.2d 963, rehearing 18 Utah2d 276, 421 P.2d 
504 (1966). 
Therefore, respondent respectfully urges this Court 
to pass the issue of the feasibility or the wisdom of collecting 
administrative error overpayments since that was not an 
issue at trial. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS THAT WERE NOT RAISED 
IN THE PLEADINGS NOR PUT IN ISSUE AT THE 
TRIAL CANNOT BE CONSIDERED FOR THE FIRST 
TIME ON APPEAL. 
The arguments raised in appellant's third and fourth 
points as well as this request for relief sought regarding 
retroactive benefits, are being presented for the first time 
on appeal. These arguments were never placed in issue in any 
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form through pleadings, motions, or at the trial. The Utah 
Supreme Court has stated the following concerning matters 
raised for the first time on appeal; "matters neither raised 
in the pleadings nor put in issue at trial cannot be considered 
for the first time on appeal." Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 
366, 482 P.2d 702, 704 (1971). See also, Park City Utah 
Corp. v. Ensign Co., 586 P.2d 450 (Utah 1978); Edgar v. 
Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977) and others too numerous to 
cite. 
In reiterating this position, the Utah Supreme 
Court stated the following in a recent welfare fraud decision: 
"We have consistently held that matters not raised in the 
trial court will not be considered by this Court on appeal." 
Department of Social Services v. Lester Romero a/k/a Ralph 
G. Romero, No. 16551, Slip op. at 2 (Utah, filed March 20, 
19 80) • 
Regarding the relief sought on appeal, there has 
never been any showing that the appellant was ever denied 
any benefits which could be considered retroactive. The 
record is void of any such evidence. The evidence, in fact, 
points to the situation that appellant received fund~ which 
the state is claiming he was overpaid. Respondent cannot 
understand how there could be "retroactive" payments since 
everything had been paid. The question is whether appellant 
should pay back the benefits received. 
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POINT IV 
THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL IS 
NOT APPLICABLE TO THIS CASE. 
Since the doctrine of estoppel is by its very 
nature equitable; it cannot be invoked unless the party 
asserting it is completely without fault. See Newton v. 
Hornblower, Inc., 224 Kan. 506, 582 P.2d 1136 (1978); 
Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Utah 1976). In 
Point II of this brief, it was shown that the appellant 
was not completely without fault in his supplying the incorrect 
information on his financial assistance application. Thus, 
the appellant should not be allowed to use the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel in this case. 
In addition, it is important to note that estoppels 
against the public are seldom allowed. Corpis Juris Secundum 
states: 
Estoppels against the public are little 
favored. They should not be invoked except 
in rare and unusual circumstances, and may 
not be invoked where they would operate to 
defeat the effective operation of a policy 
adopted to protect the public. They must 
be applied with circumspection, and should 
be applied only in those special cases 
where the interests of justice clearly 
require it." C.J.S. §138 Estoppel 675, 
676. 
The present case is not one of those rare cases in which an 
estoppel should be invoked against the government because 
(1) the appellant was not without fault, (2) an estoppel in 
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this case would defeat the state's policy of collecting 
overpayments, (3) the state approved the appellant's 
financial assistance application without knowledge of its 
inaccuracy, and (4) " ... an act or representation made through 
innocent mistake is not a ground for estoppel." 28 Am.Jur.2d 
Estoppel and Waiver §44 (1971). 
In Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 
697 (Utah 1976), this Court sets forth the elements of 
equitable estoppel as follows: 
Estoppel arises when a party by his acts, 
representations, or admissions, or by 
his silence when he ought to speak, 
intentionally or through culpable negli-
gence, induces another to believe certain 
facts to exist and that such other acting 
with reasonable prudence and diligence, 
relies and acts thereon so that he will 
suffer an injustice if the former is 
permitted to deny the existence of such 
facts. See also, J.P. Koch, Inc. v. 
J.C. Penney Co. Inc., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah 
19 7 5) . 
In the present case, it is clear that the appellant 
has failed to carry his burden of showing that the respondent 
intentionally or through culpable negligence induced the 
appellant to believe certain facts that did not exist. At 
most one could only argue that the respondent had made an 
innocent mistake in approving the appellant's financial 
assistance application. Even this argument is tenuous, 
because respondent. would not have approved the application 
had appellant given the correct information concerning his 
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home in Muleshoe, Texas. 
However, in regard to estoppel against an innocent 
mistake 28 Am.Jur.2d Estoppel and Waiver §44 (1971) states: 
It is held that where the conduct or 
representation of the party sought to 
be estopped is due to ignorance founded 
upon innocent mistake, no estoppel will 
arise. Ordinarily, estoppel will not 
arise from a mutual mistake of the parties 
as to which they are equally at fault. 
At most one could argue that the present case is a mutual 
mistake where both parties were at fault. However, even 
under this argument is would be extremely difficult to 
rationalize that appellant's fault in supplying incorrect 
information was less than or equal to respondent's fault 
in approving the financial aid application. Therefore, 
even under the most tenuous arguments the doctrine of 
equitable estoppel is not applicable to this case. 
POINT V 
APPELLANT'S INTERVIEW FOR FINANCIAL 
ASSISTANCE DID NOT INFRINGE ON APPELLANT'S 
RIGHTS OF EQUAL PROTECTION AND DUE PROCESS 
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. 
Appellant begins the fourth point of his brief 
on the assumption that his interview for financial assistance 
was conducted in English. However, in making this assumption 
appellant fails to cite any part of the record substantiating 
his claim. In fact when the record is closely scrutinized 
the opposite is found to be correct. Although it is true 
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that appellant's financial aid application was approved by 
an English speaking individual, this does not mean the 
approval was conducted without the aid of an interpreter. 
The record shows that during the time the appellant applied 
for assistance, the APA office had an interpreter whose 
native tongue was Spanish. (R. 123 and 124). The record 
also shows that the interpreter would help non-English 
speaking individuals complete their public assistance forms. 
(R. 135). 
In the present case it is not clear whether 
appellant's financial assistance application was completed 
at the APA office or at the Migrant Council office because 
the approval date of appellant's financial aid application 
was not the date when the application was filled out. (R. 
127). The application was probably co~pleted prior to the 
day or on the day it was notarized. On November 17, 1975, 
Millie Rodriquez Valencia, who reads and speaks both Spanish 
and English, notarized appellant's financial assistance 
application. (R. 143 and 145). Therefore, it is conceivable 
that Millie Valencia assisted the appellant in completing 
his financial assistance form. If Miliie Valencia d~d not 
aid the appellant in filling out the form, then the next 
most likely place where migrants filled out public assistance 
forms was at the Migrant Council office. (R. 133 and 134). 
The Migrant Council kept public assistance forms in their 
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office and had an agreement between the APA office that 
their Spanish speaking employees would assist Spanish 
speaking migrants in completing their public assistance forms. 
(R. 133 and 134). If appellant's assistance form was completed 
without the help of Millie Valencia and the Migrant Council, 
then the form was completed with the help of an interpreter 
at the APA office. In any event, appellant's financial 
assistance application was not completed without an interpreter, 
for someone not knowing or understanding English certainly 
would not understand the form to answer the question regarding 
prior employment, insurance companies, or question 18 wherein 
is written by hand "Salvador P. Toscano - torn cartilage, left 
knee." The knowledge of such English words shows some know-
ledge or help. 
In order to have this court rule as a matter of 
law that which appellant seeks, is not proper here. There is 
no evidence sufficient to support the contentions claimed. 
What appellant requests this court to hold (because this is 
all that the evidence supports) is that it is a denial of 
equal protection for a Spanish speaking person to be held 
accountable for filling out and application form. Such a 
request is beyond this case. 
As has been pointed out, there is no evidence that 
arnn-English speaking person helped fill out the form, or 
that the appellant filled it out himself. As such, appellant 
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desires this court to invent some facts which would substantiate 
his position. This should be rejected. 
CONCLUSION 
The appellant makes many assumptions throughout 
his brief which he fails to support by citing the record. 
As a result, when the record is carefully examined many of 
appellant's assumptions are found to be without foundation. 
For example, the record makes clear that the appellant had 
an interpreter available to him when he filled out his financial 
·assistance application. (See Point V of this brief). However, 
even though appellant had an interpreter assisting him, he 
still supplied incorrect information concerning his home in 
Muleshoe, Texas. Since the incorrect information made appellant 
eligible for financial assistance, the State paid the same to 
him. 
In this case the State is only collecting from the 
appellant, money which would have never been given to the 
appellant had the appellant supplied the correct information 
in the first place. Thus, a ruling in respondent's behalf 
will be a ruling in favor of giving as$istance only to those 
that are entitled to receive it. 
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Respondent respectfully urges the court to sustain 
the lower court who was able to make its decision based on 
the evidence introduced. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
STEPHEN G. SCHWENDIMAN 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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